

THE EXPLORATION OF THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIMEA STATUS REFERENDUM IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON TIMES AND XINHUA NEWS AGENCY

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Abstract

This article analyses news discourses to explore how different media depict Crimea status referendum which took place on 16th March, 2014. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is conducted to analyse three news articles of this referendum from three different media: the New York Times (the NYT), the Washington Times (the WT), and Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua). The aim of this analysis is to reveal ideological differences among the three media on depicting this issue and power imbalances within the discourses. The results show that there exist ideological differences within these three newspapers on reporting this event and the power imbalances in the discourses also reflect the ideological differences and contribute the formation of them.

Keywords: *media representations, Crimea crisis, critical discourse analysis, news discourses, ideologies*

1. Introduction

Media representations are generally regarded as fact-oriented. However, media do not simply present the truth, it uses its power to encompass concepts and ideas to convey meanings to society and to form social representations of groups, individuals and topics (Roy, 2012). It is also claimed that media institutions would embed ideologies within the discourses, accounting for various representations of events across different media (Fowler, 1991).

With regard to Crimea crisis, an event having important media coverage worldwide, it is intriguing to analyse the representations of this event in different media organizations to see if there exist ideological differences. Therefore, the representations of Crimea status referendum would be a good angle to explore this. On 16th March 2014, this referendum took place in Crimea, and the results made Crimea become part of Russia. This referendum represents the summit of

Crimea crisis, raising huge controversies in international society. As this event is a rather newly happened international issue, there is little literature or research with specific attention to the media representations of it. This research explores this gap in literature by conducting Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse the discourses in three media outlets (two in U.S. and one in China). The media outlets for analysis are *the New York Times*, *the Washington Times*, and *Xinhua News Agency*. The purpose of this study is to reveal ideological differences across these three media on this event and also to disclose power imbalances in the discourses.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Media Representations

Social Representation Theory (SRT) could help us deconstruct the notion of “representation”. Due to Moscovici, social representations are values, beliefs and practices formed in people’s interpersonal social interactive and communicative events and shared within their groups (Moscovici, 1973; Moscovici, 1988). SRT suggests that this system of values and beliefs could enable individuals to find their group identity as well as engage in the communicative events in their groups (Moscovici, 1973). Different groups of individuals might use semiotics, for instance, metaphors or icons to link the meanings to the events in order to produce their own social representations (Moscovici, 2000). Social representations shape the borderlines within different groups (Howarth, 2002).

Just as Moscovici (1963: 251) mentions, social representation is the collective elaboration “of a social object by the community for the purpose of behaving and communicating”. Specifically, an object’s the social reality could be achieved through being represented in the ways the particular communities prefer and an object is not defined simply by its immanent features but by the characteristics that individuals or organizations relate to it (Moscovici, 1973; Wagner et al., 1999).

Media are exactly the institutions that conduct this process. Roy (2012: 557) mentions that media are social platforms that “produce, construct, and transmit

meanings in society”. Media could deploy certain meanings to certain issues when representing them (Foucault et al., 1972). In media, events are neither neutrally nor naturally constructed. Media discourses are “already impregnated with social values which make up a potential perspective on events” (Fowler, 1991: 25). Therefore, news is not simply objective descriptions of facts, but the recontextualization of events, and the fixed values of news organizations are also considered to be embedded within the news discourses (Carey, 1989; Caldas-Coulthard, 2003; Roy, 2012).

Moreover, media institutions not only represent the reality with their values, but also justify them (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003). This raises the issue of the existence of power in media discourses. It is argued that the extent of explicitness of events would be made to a greater or lesser level due to how media depict them (Van Leeuwen, 1993). Furthermore, media could construct social representations by deleting or hiding the elements against their values and positions or adding some elements to strengthen their positions (Van Leeuwen, 1993).

2.2. Crimea Crisis and Relevant Research

Biersack & O’Lear (2014) conducted textual analysis into the Russian official government narratives about Crimea. It is demonstrated that there existed specific ideologies overtly stated or embedded in the narratives, rationalizing the stance of Russia in this conflict (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014). Russia regarded Ukrainian government as backed by the west whilst Ukrainian government also abolished the law allowing the use of Russian language in Crimea despite the fact that Russians constituted a large proportion of people in Crimea demographically due to historical situations (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014; Charron, 2012). Hansen (2014) conducted analysis into Putin’s political discourses and states that Putin’s political discourses could strengthen the beliefs that Putin and his political elites are right and the others are wrong. All the above-mentioned evidence indicate that Crimea crisis to some extent reflect political conflicts between different groups.

Though direct research of media representations of this referendum could not be found yet. We could review the research about the exploration of ideological differences in media representations of other particular events. Ali (2011)

analysed social representations of the execution of Saddam in newspapers and revealed that there were ideological differences between the portraits in U.S. newspapers and that of Arabic. Murata's research (2007) focuses on media representations of Japanese whaling in Japanese and Western newspapers. Different representation styles between Japanese and Western media is also presented (Murata, 2007). Roy's research (2012) sheds light on another aspect "otherness". He reveals "us-vs.-them" aspect when examining representations of Israel-Palestine relationship in U.S. media.

However, these studies have shortcomings. For Murata, focusing on a topic like "Japanese whaling" is too broad and the representativeness of the data could be suspected. The focusing point of Ali and Roy's research are relatively specific. However, it seems that they ascribe the ideological differences mainly to cultural factors whilst "culture" might not be the only factor that has influences to the formation of ideologies. Such statements appear to be unwarranted. As for my research, firstly, it does not focus on media representations of the whole Crimea crisis because it is out of the scope. Instead, representations of Crimea status referendum, which happened on 16th March, 2014 would be focused. Secondly, my research also only looks at the ideological differences and would not try to avoid unwarranted statements in the discussion.

3. Research Question

RQ: How is the independence of Crimea represented in *the New York Times*, *the Washington Times* and *Xinhua News Agency*?

This research question would be deconstructed in two perspectives. Firstly, discourse analysis would be made to reveal the ideological differences embedded in the portrayal of the referendum in *the NYT*, *the WT* and *Xinhua*. Secondly, participants involved in this event (Crimea, U.S. and Russia) would also be analysed to reveal power imbalances in the discourses to see if the imbalances contribute to the formation of ideologies.

Analysis would be conducted on three articles on *the NYT*, *the WT* and *Xinhua* respectively. The date of *the NYT* and *the WT* is 16th, March, 2014. *Xinhua* issued the report on 18th March, 2014.

4. Data Collection

The articles on *the New York Times (the NYT)*, *the Washington Times (the WT)* and *Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua)* serve as the data for this research. *The NYT* is selected for this research because it has long been viewed as the national “newspaper of record”, which has the second largest circulation in U.S. and could influence other newspapers in the U.S. and even around the globe (McCombs, 2004; The Associated Press, 2013). It is also intriguing to analyse the article of *the NYT* because it is considered to have a liberal reputation (Okrent, 2004). As for *the WT*, it is chosen because unlike *the NYT*, it has been criticized to have extreme conservative political stance (Blumenthal, 2006). In addition, *Xinhua* is also chosen as the data because it is the most influential media organization in China. It is owned by the Chinese government and regarded as the propaganda machine of Chinese Communist Party, which is quite different from *the NYT* and *the WT* that are owned by media companies. It is intriguing to analyse, compare and contrast the discourses from two completely different media systems – U.S. and China.

5. Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis

This research conducts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyse the data. According to Richardson (2007: 27), CDA is a systematic methodology that reveals “a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations”.

Within different schools of CDA, I choose Van Dijk’s approach because it is an analytical framework for analysing the structures of news articles (Van Dijk, 1985). Discourse structures could influence, facilitate or even determine the construction of social representations (Van Dijk, 1993). That Van Dijk’s approach is derived from social representation theory adds credit to revealing the social representations in media as well (Wodak & Meyer, 2012). Drawing from Van

Dijk's approach of CDA, the analysis would be conducted from the following several perspectives.

5.1. The Macro-Semantic Analysis

The macro-semantic analysis could provide us with the general representation and characterization of news articles on the global level and could also help reveal the macro-position of text (Van Dijk, 1977; Van Dijk, 1985). In this research focus would be given to analyse the headlines and leads of news articles in order to reveal the global meaning because according to Van Dijk (1988), headlines and leads together function as the major introduction of the topics. Also, news text has hierarchically organizations. Macrostructure is hierarchically organized, also known as the "top-to-bottom" arrangement, with important content expressed in headlines and leads followed by other lower level of macrostructures consisted of sentences and paragraphs (Van Dijk, 1985). The overall position of a whole news story is always well epitomised in its headlines concisely (Ali, 2010).

5.2. The Superstructure Analysis

The superstructure analysis means analysis into the overall organization and arrangement of news structures. Superstructures are defined as schemata with fixed and conventional nature for news discourses (Van Dijk, 1980; Van Dijk, 1985). It is of significant importance to analyse the structures because either readers would possibly abstract the themes merely from skimming the structures of the text and authors could take advantage of the structures to influence or guide the readers' comprehension (Van Dijk, 1985). The content of schemata, such as the introduction, the arguments, the conclusion, and the introduction-summary could be arranged in a way that supports the macro-position of a news story (Van Dijk, 1980; Van Dijk, 1985; Van Dijk, 1993).

5.3. The Local Meaning Analysis

According to Van Dijk (1993; 2009), local meaning analysis means conducting semantic examinations into the meaning formed by words and sentences in order to reveal the relationships between propositions in the discourses for it is argued that the choices of lexical and other micro linguistic features would reflect the

writers' mental models of ideologies of the events embedded in news discourses (Van Dijk, 1998; Van Dijk, 2009). The core of local meaning analysis is what Van Dijk (1998) proposes as "the ideological square". More specifically, the local meaning analysis addresses the examination of specificity, completeness, perspectives, implicitness of the discourses on the micro level etc. to reveal the ideologies from the representations of "us-vs.-them" dimension. (Van Dijk, 1993; Van Dijk, 1998). Usually the representation of "us-vs.-them" is "signalled by positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation or derogation" (Van Dijk, 1993: 275). Micro-level analysis of specific languages used in news discourses would also be conducted in the process of analysing local meanings because of its importance. Van Dijk (1993) mentions that the style analysis includes the analysis into lexical styles, syntactic styles, rhetorical styles and so on. Therefore the micro-analysis in this research would follow the way that is aforementioned.

5.4. Research Validity and Reliability

However, CDA also has limitations. One is that it lacks objectivity in the process of analysing the data. It is claimed that CDA is neither objective nor neutral because it presupposes a theory as a starting point and such a top-down manner would possibly lead the researcher to analyse the data from a biased view and select the data that fits into the theoretical framework (Breeze 2011; Page et.al 2014). With regards to this perspective, the methodology of this research is systematic as it is mentioned before. In other words, the research will conduct the same criteria to analyse the data from different newspaper to reduce the subjectivity. Another perspective is that CDA only looks at small fragments of data and fails to address the representativeness of the data (Stubbs, 1997; Widdowson, 1998; Rogers et al, 2005). However, Breeze (2011: 505) states that it is inappropriate to deny the research results by CDA researchers only due to this limitation because "close, qualitative analysis of a small sample of text might be the only way of analysing certain types of discourse". This argument provides us with the way of minimizing the limitation of CDA in practical analysis. This research narrows down its focusing point and looks only at the media representations of the controversial Crimea status referendum in order to tackle

this problem. Furthermore, since only the small fragments of data is analysed, it could to some extent avoid the problem of over-generalisation.

6. Data Analysis

Full articles are provided in the appendices. The discourses are also signalled by line numbers in the appendices (e.g. APP-I, L101). Some discourses are also underlined in the appedices. As for *Xinhua*, English translations of Chinese discourses are in the footnotes of Appendix III.

6.1. Analysis of the New York Times (the NYT)

The Macro-Semantic Analysis

The global meaning of *the NYT* takes a less extreme stance than *the WT*. It does not focus on the sovereignty of Crimea. In other words, it does not address which country Crimea should belong to after the referendum. What *the NYT* addresses is the complexity of Crimea crisis and the call for peaceful solutions.

Evidence could be found in the headline (See H in APP-I), where the journalist uses “keep watch”, a relatively moderate phrase to describe the presence of Russian troops, indicating *the NYT*’s less extreme macro-position on this issue. The complexity of Crimea issue is expressed in the lead and the paragraph behind. The lead not only mentions the illegality that Western leaders claimed towards the referendum (APP-I, L4), but also portrays the voters by using “an overwhelming majority of (APP-I, L2)”, indicating that the choice of secession is based on the local people’s will rather than Russia’s military pressure.

The Superstructure Analysis

The superstructure is embedded with one major argument: “Crimea crisis needs peaceful solutions”. This argument is supported from three sections in the superstructure.

The first section starts from L12 to L32 (APP-I) and portrays the current situation, which indicates that Crimea issue is serious and needs solutions. For example, from L12 to L17 (APP-I), it is semantically meant that every decision Putin was about to make could seriously affect the local people’s livelihood; from L18 to

L21 (APP-I), the situation is presented that Ukraine might suspend the energy supply to Crimea if Putin continued the annexation. All these evidence reflect the argument that it is crucial for this unstable situation to receive bilateral solution between Ukraine and Russia.

The second section, starting from L33 to L60 (APP-I), presents the tough attitudes U.S. and Russia held towards each other, indicating the urgent need for peaceful solutions. An example of this could be seen in the text (APP-I, L33 to L35): “but the statements they later released had little if any hint of progress toward a peaceful resolution of the crisis.” The discourse expresses the worry that U.S and Russia’s tough attitudes might hinder the dialogue, revealing the media’s call for appropriate solutions on this issue.

The third section starts from L61 (APP-I) to the end, where opinions from different cultural groups towards the referendum are presented. This comparison and contrast also reflects the ideology that Crimea situation is uncertain, problematic and needs a good solution. An example of this could be seen in L134 and L135 (APP-I): “Sunday’s vote, however, threatened to split the society in numerous, and perhaps unexpected ways.” This discourse addresses that the referendum has evoked and exacerbated the conflicts among different cultural groups, demonstrating the need for peaceful solutions.

The Local Meaning Analysis

Generally, *the NYT* portrays the referendum as an uncertain and problematic issue. It could be seen from some places where the word “referendum” emerged (APP-I, L4, L36 to L37, L90 to L91 and L94 to L95), the referendum is negatively depicted. However, the author also addresses the rationality of the referendum by referring to historical and cultural context of Crimea. For example, in L7 (APP-I), the outcome of the referendum is described as a “foregone conclusion”, which means the secession is reasonable because of Crimea’s historical affiliation with Russia (APP-I, L6). In L101 and L102 (APP-I), the introduction of Crimea’s history also rationalizes the legality of this referendum. The act of rationalizing also appears in the citation of Putin’s sayings in L47 to L50 (APP-I), in which

Putin refers the independence of Crimea to the break-away of Kosovar Albanians from Serbia.

Uncertainty of Crimea issue is also reflected in the depiction of the reaction of Crimean. On the one hand, the author addresses the jubilation of pro-Russian voters through the quotations of their opinions (APP-I, L70 to L72; L73 to L76; L118 to L120). On the other hand, opinions against the referendum are also presented (APP-I, L140 to L141; L142 to L143). Presentations of different group opinions indicate the ideology that the cultural conflicts are deepened due to the referendum, reflecting the macro-position that this issue should be peacefully solved.

As for Russia, though *the NYT* portrays Russia and Putin in a general negative term, the aim of such negative portrayal seems to be not merely the condemnation of Russia's intervention into Crimea but more about the worries of the livelihood of Crimean. For example, From L15 to L17 (APP-I), Crimea crisis is compared to Russia's recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, which resulted in ruins of the local people's livelihood in 2008. Such comparison expresses the newspapers' concerns about the livelihood in Crimean people in the future. Moreover, Van Dijk (1993) states that preferred information is usually presented with specificity and completeness rather than generality. In the discourses of L53 to L56 (APP-I), Putin's arrogance and confidence is depicted with specificity. He would rather choose to patiently stay in Sochi watching the ceremony, ignoring the Western attitudes than pay attention to Crimea region. From all the aforementioned evidence, we could see that though the author addresses the condemnation of Russia in this event, the concentration of this article is to express the ideology that the livelihood of public should be cared about and the crisis needs a good solution.

The article does not spend much space on portraying America. L33 to L45 (APP-I) is the only place that U.S.'s stance is depicted specifically. However, these discourses do not seem to depict U.S. as in-group or a group with justice. It carries a rather narrative tone. Such depiction resonates with the ideology that *the NYT* does not take a side; it simply concentrates on how peaceful solution of the crisis.

6.2 Analysis of the Washington Times (the WT)

The Macro-Semantic Analysis

The global meaning of *the WT* report explicitly indicates a one-sided stance. The phrase “U.S. rejects” (see H in APP-II), which is an active voice accentuating the agent of the action (Johnstone, 2008), explicitly addresses the ideological inclination of *the WT*: that U.S. is firmly against the illegal referendum in Crimea. The macro-position is also consolidated in the lead. The author uses “under the gaze of Russian military forces (APP-II, L1)” to describe Russian military presence. Compared to the mild expression “keep watch” in *the NYT*, the word “gaze” explicitly addresses the pressure from Russia on the people in Crimea, establishing the causal relationship between the outcome of the referendum and Russia military threat. Moreover, the author also describes the relationship between Russia and West as “Cold War-style tensions (APP-II, L3)”, explicitly referring Russia to USSR which was portrayed as enemies in the Western media in the Cold War period.

The Superstructure Analysis

Unlike *the NYT*, the superstructure of *the WT* is rather simple. The article does not mention any historical context of Crimea and show any attention to the livelihood of citizens in that region. Instead, it simply establishes the good-vs-bad ideology between U.S. and Russia. The article could be divided into two main parts for realizing this process.

The first section, starting from L5 to L50 (APP-II), concentrates on conducting negative-other-representation to portray the referendum and Russia, achieving the goal of defining the referendum as Russia’s action of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. Evidence is from the citations of anti-Russia political figures’ sayings (APP-II, L32 to L38; L42 to L44). The author uses these quotations to address the illegality of this referendum, defining the event as the consequence of Russia’s intrusion.

The second section, beginning from L51 (APP-II) to the end, accentuates the sanctions to be imposed on Russia and rationalizes this action with direct or

indirect citations from political figures. For example, in L71 to L73 (APP-II), it is written that Royce urged U.S. administration to punish “who have brought about this crisis”. The discourse clearly indicates that Russia is “the cause of the crisis”, thus portraying U.S. as a country with justice and rationalizing the act of imposing sanctions. In sum, the schemata reflect the macro-position that Russia is the cause of the Crimea crisis and U.S. should take sanctions to Russia in order to solve it.

The Local Meaning Analysis

The WT portrays the referendum completely in a negative term as totally illegal. From a lexical perspective, all words describing the referendum are explicitly negative. For instance, in APP-II, “illegitimate” in L6, “sham referendum” in L32, “the so-called referendum” and “circus performance” in L46 and L47 and “the phony referendum” in L74 all demonstrate the newspapers’ stance of denying the legality of this referendum and Crimea’s independence. Moreover, there is not any background information of the referendum in text, indicating that specific information of the referendum is not preferred, thus further contributing to the negative depiction of the referendum.

The negative portrait of Russia further strengthens the illegality of the referendum. Russia is explicitly depicted in a negative term as a military threat to Crimea and even to Europe. From a lexical level, Russia is simply associated with the words conveying the ideology of danger and threat such as “military forces” (APP-II, L1), “military intervention” (APP-II, L9), “Moscow’s show of force” (APP-II, L39) and “large-scale Russia military exercises” (APP-II, L60), giving the readers the ideology that Russia’s military presence in Crimea is a threat to the peace in and around the region. Moreover, semantically the author also uses “anchoring” to represent Russia as the enemies. Höijer (2011: 7) states that anchoring is that “new ideas or phenomenon are related to a well-known phenomenon or context”. In L3 (APP-II), the phrase “Cold War-style tensions” refers Russia to USSR; in L19 (APP-II). “Vladimir Lenin” is mentioned, indicating that Russia’s annexation of Crimea would possibly be the revival of Communism; in L74 (APP-II), “Soviet era” is again referred to. All these anchoring promptly separates Russia as an out-group from the US and West in

this event. Besides, almost everything related to U.S.'s criticisms about Russia is presented with great specificity, from Obama's announcement (APP-II, L8 to L12), the Senator Murphy's comment on Crimea (APP-II, L32 to L38) to Royce's suggestions to urge the US administration to impose sanctions to Russia (APP-II, L71 to 76). The negative portrait of Russia as a military threat and the anchoring to USSR all demonstrate that Crimea suffer from Russian intervention, strengthening the claim that the referendum is illegal.

The U.S. and Western countries are depicted as the in-group against Russia. Specificity and generality also play a crucial role in drawing the borderlines between "us" and "others". In L5 (APP-II), it is written "The United States and other countries promptly rejected the referendum as illegitimate". However, the "other countries" is presented with vagueness, conveying ideology that many countries support U.S., isolating Russia in this event. Another example is in L91 and L92 (APP-II): "Washington's allies in Western Europe", grouping U.S. and Europe together against Russia. U.S. was also associated with "military" in this article. However, semantically and lexically, it is portrayed as a passive side, that is, due to the threat from Russia, U.S. had to take military actions to stop the crisis. In L27 (APP-II), the author uses "triggered" to depict how the US is "forced" by Russia to send troops to Crimea. In L31 (APP-II), the author uses "rattled" to depict that Obama and U.S. administration have been shocked by Russian military forces. Such depiction rationalizes U.S.'s act of imposing sanctions to Russia.

6.3 Analysis of Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua)

The Macro-Semantic Analysis

The macro-position of *Xinhua* also appears to be not extreme. However, unlike the headlines of *the NYT* and *the WT*, which focus on the "secession" of Crimea from Ukraine, the headline of *Xinhua* emphasized the "independence" of Crimea and its "joining" with Russia (see H in APP-III). Such dichotomy implicitly conveys the ideology that the independence referendum is legal and based on Crimean people's will.

When describing Crimea's act of joining with Russia, the word “申请” (English meaning: applying) is used in the headline (see H in APP-III). In Chinese, the word “申请” is used when the act of applying is recognized as formal and legal. Moreover, *Xinhua*'s depiction of Crimea “applying” to join Russia to some extent indicates the subordinate affiliation of Crimea with Russia. Therefore, though implicitly, the global meaning appears to recognize the legality of the referendum. In the lead, it is also written that the referendum is the vote that Crimean people carried out to determine their own status (APP-III, L1), which indicates that the referendum is the reflection of Crimean people's will to decide the future of this region rather than the circus performance threatened by Russia.

The Superstructure Analysis

The superstructure of *Xinhua* is arranged in a sequence that consists of the summary of the referendum, the challenges that Crimea would face in future, the international reaction and analysis of this Crisis from the agency. The schemata are embedded with two arguments: the referendum is based on local people's will and Russia and Crimea have mutual consensus towards each other.

From L6 to L26 (APP-III), it is depicted that either Crimean people or Crimea administration is willing to let the region join Russia. In L6 (APP-III), the sub-headline states that citizens “overwhelmingly” chose to join Russia, overtly expressing local people's will. In L14 (APP-III), the sub-headline states that Crimean delegation would go to Russia for further consultation with Russia over Crimea.

It is noteworthy that in L32 and L33 (APP-III), Crimean Prime Minister Aksyonov's words are cited: To join with Russia is a simple process but the acknowledgement might take about a year. The content from L43 to L55 (APP-III) narrates Russia's claim that the legislation about Crimean is in progress, echoing with the quotation of Askysnov. Such schemata reveal the ideology that Russia and Crimea held mutual consensus on this issue.

It is also intriguing to note that the information about U.S. is either deleted and concealed in the text or placed in a less important position. Due to Van Dijk

(1980), the introduction part of a news text (e.g. the lead) is of great significance because it plays the role of abstracting the whole news story and expressing the stance of the article. In the text of *Xinhua*, the introduction part contains no information about U.S.'s attitudes towards the referendum (APP-III, L1 to L5). Instead, the information about U.S. is placed in the relatively latter part of the text with narrative tone (APP-III, L66 to L80), which is considered less important in the organization of news schemata. Such arrangement of schemata implicitly indicates *Xinhua*'s pro-Russia stance.

The Local Meaning Analysis

Xinhua portrays the referendum as the Crimea's own will. From a lexical perspective, in L22 to L23 (APP-III), the underlines mean that the Crimea delegation will fly to Moscow and carry out "further consultation" with Russia about Crimea's joining. Such lexis reveals the ideology that that Crimea is looking forward to joining Russia. Moreover, in L19 to L20 (APP-III), the underlines mean that Crimea "has already set up" a new Central Bank and this newly established central bank "will become (APP-III, L20)" subordinate to Russian Central Bank in future. Such adoption of words not only demonstrates the will of Crimea's joining Russia, but also reveals that the joining has already been processed. Semantically, Crimea is also depicted as the allies of Russia and to have subordinate status. For instance, in L26 (APP-III), the sentence means Russia will provide 15 billion roubles economic assistance to Crimea. Here, Russia is presented as the backbone of Crimea, thus categorising them together as one group.

Unlike the article in *the WT* where Russia is depicted as a country that violates the international rules and consensus, *Xinhua* depicts Russia as a country that respects the spirit of legislation. Such depiction reveals the ideology that the referendum is legal. Evidence could be found in L46 to L47 (APP-III), it is written that Russian House of Commons will start its consideration of Crimea's joining and it will take about 3 to 21 days for legislation. The "legislation" is again emphasized from L48 to L50 (APP-III), the saying of Vice Chairman of the House of Lords in Russia is cited that the legislative process would not be delayed and the decision will be

made in the shortest possible time. The repetitive emphasis of legislation indicates that Russia's annexation of Crimea depends on law rather than military portrayed in *the WT* and *the NYT*. The ideology is further strengthened by the citation of Putin's opinions in L106 to L107 (APP-III), which means that the Crimea referendum is consistent with international rules and the United Nations Charter.

The presentation of China's stance on this issue conveys the pro-Russian stance of *Xinhua* on this issue. Lexically, in L83 (APP-III), it is stated that China's stance is "objective" and "impartial", which seems neutral. However, in L84 to L85 (APP-III), it is stated that China hopes the issue could be solved through dialogue. This implicitly indicates that China is against the ways other than peaceful dialogues, such as the sanctions imposed by U.S., to some extent revealing China's pro-Russian stance.

7. Discussion & Conclusion

The aim of this study is to reveal ideological differences of the depiction of Crimea status referendum among *the NYT*, *the WT* and *Xinhua*. The results illustrate that there exist ideological differences as what Fowler (1991) suggests: newspapers would embed its values and beliefs within the discourses. *The NYT* takes a less extreme stance than the other two media. It addresses that the crisis should be solved peacefully for local people's livelihood. *The WT* explicitly expresses its anti-Russian stance, portrays the referendum as an illegal event controlled by Russia and suggests that the solution to the crisis is U.S.'s sanctions to Russia. *Xinhua* takes an implicit pro-Russian stance though the discourses seem neutral.

There are several perspectives worthy of discussion. Firstly, it is found in this research that news media could embed their ideologies through recontextualization of events (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003). From the macro-semantic and superstructure analysis, the function of "recontextualization" shows its existence. For example, the article of *the WT* presents many political figures' anti-Russian opinions but provides no information about the background of Crimea. Such recontextualization achieves in forming the anti-Russian ideology. In *the NYT*, where the anti-Russian ideology is less severe than that of *the WT*, information related to Crimea's historical and cultural affiliation with Russia is

presented. *Xinhua* recontextualizes this event by emphasizing the legality of the referendum and the legislation process of Russia, thus embedding its pro-Russian stance.

Another perspective is about the power imbalances in the discourses. There exist power imbalances in the portrayal of participants in the three news reports and power imbalances also reflect the formation of ideologies. These power imbalances are specifically reflected by the negative-other-representation, which is clearly found in *the WT*, where Russia is completely pinned to negative representations whilst U.S. is represented as a side with justice. The power imbalances in the discourses also reflect the power inequity between media institutions and audience. Media could form social representations to make individuals relate the phenomenon to the established orders (Moscovici, 1973; 1984). Such “established orders” (e.g. the anchoring of Soviet Union in *the WT*) reflects media’s prescriptive attitudes of imposing social conventions upon the audience, which also contribute to the formation of ideologies.

As for *the NYT*, the power imbalances appears to be not explicit. For example, *the NYT* does indeed condemns Russia, however, the aim of the condemnation is not about Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty but more about accusing Russia and Putin of ruining local people’s livelihood. The article does not portray U.S. in a completely positive term as well (see APP-I, L33 to L35). The phenomenon might be partly due to its liberal characteristics. It could be seen from the saying of Henry Jarvis Raymond , the co-founder of *the NYT*, that “We do not believe that everything in society is either exactly right, or exactly wrong; what is good we desire to preserve and improve; what is evil, to exterminate, or reform” (Meyer, 2001). This statement reflects that the core ideology of *the NYT* is not to take a side. Its aim is to support the “public good”. The results of this research related to *the NYT* to some extent appear consistent with this argument.

With regard to *Xinhua*, situation is different. An important aspect which differentiates *Xinhua* from the other two media is the ownership. It is owned by Chinese government rather than media companies. The ideology in *Xinhua* echoes with Chinese government’s stance. China and Russia have strategic partnership.

However, Chinese President Xi also called for the establishment of a global network of partnerships, which to some extent hinder the strategic partnership between Russia and China from turning into alliance (Bin, 2015). This could account for *Xinhua*'s implicitness when expressing its pro-Russian stance. *Xinhua* does not explicitly condemn U.S. for its sanctions over Russia. puts such information in a less important position. It shows its pro-Russian stance by rationalizing Russia's annexation of Crimea and the referendum which discourses depict as based on people's will. It could also be linked to the vote of the commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty integrity on 15th March in the UN Security Council, where 13 nations voted in favour of the resolution whilst China abstained. Such "neutrality" of Chinese government over this issue might account for the expression in the article where Chinese stance is claimed as "objective and impartial".

Thirdly, different representations in U.S. and China might reflect the different types of social representations. The representations of Crimea referendum in *the NYT* and *the WT* reflects what Moscovici (1988:221) proposes "polemic representations", which means the representations of conflicts which the whole society does not share them. Therefore, the difference in the representations of Crimea independence in *the NYT* (liberal) and *the WT* (conservative) might reflect the divergence of the political and social debates about this issue. In *Xinhua*, a propaganda machine, the depiction of this issue reflects its formation of "hegemonic representations", which means the social representation shared within the society though this consensus might be coercively imposed (Moscovici, 1988). The difference within the types of social representations between U.S. and China reflect different systems of media in two countries, which could be an intriguing area for future research to explore.

There are also some limitations in this research. One is that CDA lacks rigorous methodological conventions. Another limitation is that whether the ideologies indeed exist or they are just the subjective interpretations of CDA scholars remain problematic (cf. Van Hout & Macgilchrist, 2010). With regard to the two limitations, what I suggest is that CDA researchers in future should be encouraged

to design a universally systematic set of rules for analysis. And also the existence of ideology should be disclosed from much more amount of data.

Biographical Section

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Appendix I

(H) *The New York Times*: Crimea Votes to Secede From Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep Watch

By David M. Herszenhorn March 16, 2014

1 SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — With thousands of heavily armed Russian troops
2 occupying this perennially embattled peninsula, an overwhelming majority of
3 Crimeans voted on Sunday to secede from Ukraine and join Russia, resolutely
4 carrying out a public referendum that Western leaders had declared illegal and
5 vowed to punish with economic sanctions.

6 The outcome, in a region that shares a language and centuries of history with
7 Russia, was a foregone conclusion even before exit polls showed more than 93
8 percent of voters favoring secession. Still, the result deepened the conflict over
9 Ukraine, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide how swiftly
10 and forcefully to levy threatened sanctions against Russian officials including top
11 aides to President Vladimir V. Putin.

12 With the voting complete, Mr. Putin, who had stalled on the question of
13 annexation by saying he wanted to hear the Crimean public proclaim its will, is
14 now under pressure to make a decision. He could move ahead — a complex and
15 costly venture given the peninsula's geographic isolation — or leave more than
16 two million people, whose well-being he vowed to protect, in the limbo of other
17 Russian-backed breakaway regions like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Georgia.

18 Should he annex Crimea, Mr. Putin could find himself quickly forced into
19 negotiations with the fledgling government in Kiev that he has so far refused to
20 recognize or meet, or face a serious conflict over water, energy and other
21 essentials for which Crimea is largely dependent on mainland Ukraine.

22 Mr. Putin also needs to decide what to do about Ukrainian military personnel,
23 many surrounded for more than two weeks on bases throughout Crimea, and
24 refusing to surrender.

25 Unrest continued to swirl in eastern Ukraine as well, where Russian troops have
26 massed along the border, raising fears of a new military incursion into mainland
27 Ukraine. In Kharkiv, several thousand pro-Russia demonstrators scuffled on
28 Sunday with the police outside the governor's office. The crowd shouted, "Putin!
29 Putin! Putin!" and "Crimea we are with you!" After pushing against the thick
30 ranks of Ukrainian police guarding the governor's office for several minutes, the
31 crowd marched to the Russian Consulate, carrying Russian flags and freshly made
32 red banners that read "Russian Spring."

33 President Obama spoke with Mr. Putin by telephone on Sunday, but the
34 statements they later released had little if any hint of progress toward a peaceful
35 resolution of the crisis.

36 "President Obama emphasized that the Crimean 'referendum,' which violates the
37 Ukrainian constitution and occurred under the duress of Russian military
38 intervention, would not be recognized by the United States and the international
39 community," the White House said in its statement. The president, it added, again
40 warned of "additional costs" to be imposed on Russia and urged Mr. Putin to take
41 "a clear path for resolving this crisis diplomatically."

42 Secretary of State John Kerry also expressed concern in a phone call on Sunday
43 with his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov, about "continuing provocations"
44 in eastern cities, where American officials have accused the Kremlin and its
45 intelligence agents of fomenting unrest.

46 For his part, according to the Kremlin, Mr. Putin called the referendum "fully
47 consistent with international law and the U.N. Charter" and cited what he called
48 the famous Kosovo precedent, referring to the province that amid atrocities on
49 Kosovar Albanians broke away from Serbia with Western help and eventually
50 declared independence. Mr. Putin repeated his claims that the Russian-speaking
51 population in Crimea was being terrorized by rampant ultranationalist and radical
52 groups and said that European monitors should be allowed into all of Ukraine.

53 In a sign of Mr. Putin's extreme confidence, and the West's relatively limited
54 options to confront him, the Russian president remained in the southern resort city

55 of Sochi, where he watched the final events of the Paralympics and planned to
56 attend the closing ceremony.

57 Mr. Putin's spokesman, Dmitri S. Peskov, at the same time, brushed aside a
58 warning from the leaders of the Group of 7 world powers of unspecified
59 consequences for Russia's violation of international law in Crimea, saying it
60 would have no effect on Russia's policies.

61 Despite the uncertainties still surrounding Crimea, jubilant victory parties broke
62 out long before the polls closed here in Simferopol, the capital, and in Sevastopol,
63 where Russia has long maintained the headquarters of its Black Sea fleet. In
64 Simferopol's Lenin Square a crowd of thousands celebrated late into the night
65 creating a sea of Russian flags, pumping their fists in the air in victory and
66 chanting "Russia! Russia!"

67 As they left the polls, after casting paper ballots, many voters were ebullient and
68 expressed no concern about the soldiers with automatic weapons deployed across
69 the peninsula.

70 "Our people must be united in Russia," Yelena Parkholenko, 27, a manicurist with
71 violet hair, said matter-of-factly after casting her vote at School No. 21 in
72 Simferopol.

73 "We were not asked when Crimea was combined with Ukraine. Now they are
74 asking us," said Svetlana Fedotova, a small-business owner, who arrived to vote
75 at School No. 21, with her daughter, Yekaterina, and 9-month-old granddaughter
76 Yelizaveta. "We're Russian and we want to live in Russia."

77 Citizens with misgivings about joining Mr. Putin's Russian Federation,
78 particularly Crimean Tatars, a Muslim Turkic people with a history of persecution
79 by Russia, generally opted to stay home rather than participate in what they called
80 a rigged vote.

81 At a cultural center that served as a polling station in Bakhchysaray, the historical
82 home of Crimean Tatars, few if any Tatars were casting ballots.

83 Early on Sunday, Enrique Ravello, an election observer visiting Simferopol from
84 Catalonia, Spain, and a supporter of the separatist movement there, praised the
85 strong voter turnout and said his region was envious of Crimea.

86 “Crimea in Catalonia is for us an example, for what we would like to do,” Mr.
87 Ravello said. “We don’t know if the so-called Western democratic Spain will
88 permit us to be as free as you are today.”

89 Freedom, however, was a matter of debate, especially given the Russian military
90 presence. The referendum also offered no option that would maintain Crimea’s
91 current status of limited autonomy from the Ukrainian government.

92 In Kiev, the new government held an emergency cabinet meeting to discuss the
93 continuing military threat in eastern Ukraine. The acting prime minister, Arseny
94 P. Yatsenyuk, told ministers that the government would prosecute the organizers
95 of the referendum and others supporting Crimean separatism. Mr. Yatsenyuk said
96 the organizers were now “under the cover of Russian troops” but the Ukrainian
97 government would “bring them to justice in Ukrainian and international courts.”

98 On Saturday, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to dissolve the Crimean Parliament
99 — a step that was largely symbolic given that it was blithely ignored here in
100 Simferopol.

101 Crimea was effectively part of Russia from the late 1700s until the dissolution of
102 the Soviet Union in 1991. Geographically, however, the peninsula is isolated from
103 Russia, and annexing it could prove logistically complicated and exceedingly
104 costly at a time when the Kremlin is bracing for an economic slowdown.

105 On Saturday, Russian forces arrived by helicopter to seize control of a natural gas
106 terminal just outside the Crimean border, drawing renewed threats of military
107 retaliation by the government in Kiev, but also underscoring the enormous
108 challenges that lie ahead for Russia should it move forward with the annexation.

109 Voters on Sunday said that they were not deterred from charting their new course
110 toward Russia, despite fears that vital utility services, transportation arteries and
111 business links could be cut off. A bridge across the Strait of Kerch, the smallest
112 water body separating Russia from Crimea, would take years to build.

113 In exit interviews at the polls, many voters expressed joy at the prospect of
114 leaving Ukraine and absolute faith that Mr. Putin would make the transition
115 smooth, issuing new passports, paying pensions and providing other benefits.

116 For many voters, religious affiliation was also a major factor in supporting
117 secession from Ukraine.

118 “I’m Orthodox, and Orthodoxy began in Crimea.” said Yury Lyudmilov, 72, a
119 poet and film director with flowing white hair who came to vote under overcast
120 skies in dark-tinted glasses. “Orthodox people must be reunited.”

121 Referring to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Mr. Lyudmilov added, “This is all
122 Russia — greater Russia, minor Russia and white Russia.”

123 Sergei Aksyonov, the pro-Russian prime minister of Crimea, has sought to
124 reassure residents that contingency plans are in place, and that it would not be in
125 Ukraine’s interest to break current agreements on supplies of water, electricity,
126 natural gas and other essentials.

127 “There are absolutely no grounds for switching the power off,” Mr. Aksyonov
128 said at a news conference last week. “The bills are being paid in full and in
129 compliance with the legislation of Ukraine. Such outages are possible only if it’s
130 done of nuisance to play a nasty trick on Crimeans.”

131 Crimeans, whose numbers include a majority of ethnic Russians, as well as ethnic
132 Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and dozens of other ethnicities, have lived peacefully
133 over the nearly quarter-century of Ukrainian independence.

134 Sunday’s vote, however, threatened to split society in numerous, and perhaps
135 unexpected, ways. In addition to Crimean Tatars, who make up about 12 percent
136 of the population and generally oppose becoming part of Russia, many young
137 Crimeans, born after Ukrainian independence, have come out strongly against the
138 referendum, putting them in conflict with their parents and grandparents, some of
139 whom have fond memories of the Soviet Union.

140 “The vote is fiction.” said Kseniya Zaplantinskaya, 19, a philosophy student. “In
141 my family there are different opinions; my parents are for Russia.”

142 Anastasia Sherbina, 21, a medical student, said she would vote for Crimea to
143 remain part of Ukraine, the only national identity she has ever known. “I was born
144 here,” Ms. Sherbina said. “I’ve lived here. I want to be a Ukrainian.”

145 In Bakhchysaray, Nina Trofimovna, 68, offered the opposite view. “We’re
146 returning home to Russia,” she said. “It won’t be simple, but we’re ready for
147 anything because we’re going home.

Appendix II

(H) *The Washington Times*: Crimea votes in favor of secession; U.S. rejects

By Guy Taylor - The Washington Times - Sunday, March 16, 2014

1 Under the gaze of Russian military forces Sunday, citizens of Crimea voted
2 overwhelmingly in favor of splitting off from Ukraine to become a part of
3 territorial Russia, a development likely to further stoke Cold War-style tensions
4 that have been escalating for weeks between Moscow and the West.

5 The United States and other countries promptly rejected the referendum as
6 illegitimate, and President Obama called Russian President Vladimir Putin on
7 Sunday afternoon to reiterate that stance.

8 “President Obama emphasized that the Crimean ‘referendum,’ which violates the
9 Ukrainian constitution and occurred under duress of Russian military intervention,
10 would never be recognized by the United States and the international
11 community,” the White House said in a statement Sunday evening that threatened
12 “additional costs” for Russia and suggested the Kremlin had paths to avoid them.

13 With about three-quarters of the votes counted, more than 95 percent were in
14 favor of joining Russia, according to a Crimean Electoral Commission count,
15 which prompted celebrations among the province’s ethnic Russians.

16 “We want to go back home, and today we are going back home,” Viktoria
17 Chernyshova, a 38-year-old businesswoman, told The Associated Press at a
18 square in Simferopol where revelers pulled out Russian flags and decorated a
19 statue of communist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. “We needed to save ourselves
20 from those unprincipled clowns who have taken power in Kiev.”

21 The vote and resulting celebrations prompted outrage in the Ukrainian capital of
22 Kiev, where a group of interim leaders have appeared powerless against Russian
23 military and political meddling in Crimea since Ukraine’s pro-Russian president,
24 Viktor Yanukovich, was driven from power last month by a series of massive
25 protests.

26 Moscow responded to the Yanukovich ouster by sending troops into the majority
27 ethnic-Russian Crimean Peninsula. The move triggered the U.S. to build up its
28 own military assets the region.

29 Although analysts say the threat of a U.S.-Russian military confrontation remains
30 unlikely, the growing presence of Russian forces on Ukraine's border and fanned
31 out across Crimea has rattled the Obama administration and U.S. lawmakers.

32 Sen. Christopher Murphy, Connecticut Democrat, said Sunday that the "sham
33 referendum" may be only the first step and noted that the events of the past few
34 months would have sounded ridiculous only a few years ago.

35 "This is a threat to the territorial integrity of Europe. Who knows who's next? It
36 was laughable five years ago to think that Russia would march on Ukraine. Five
37 years from now, it may be a NATO country that's in jeopardy." he said on ABC's
38 "This Week."

39 Moscow's show of force prompted the White House to say that Crimea's
40 secession vote, even before the expected results were announced, was
41 "administered under threats of violence and intimidation" from Moscow.

42 White House spokesman Jay Carney also said the referendum was being held
43 "contrary to Ukraine's constitution, and the international community will not
44 recognize the results."

45 Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who met with Mr. Obama at the
46 White House last week, denounced the "so-called referendum" as a "circus
47 performance ... under the stage direction of the Russian Federation."

48 Outside recognition or not, Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov said on
49 Twitter that his parliament would meet Monday and formally ask Russia to annex
50 the province. Some lawmakers then would fly to Moscow for talks, he said.

51 What remains to be seen is whether the White House will carry through with
52 threats to impose economic sanctions on Russia, which the administration accuses
53 of intruding on Ukraine's sovereignty in violation of European and international
54 law.

55 In its statement on the phone call, the White House said Mr. Obama emphasized
56 that Washington is “prepared to impose additional costs on Russia for its actions.”

57 While Mr. Obama told Mr. Putin there “remains a clear path for resolving this
58 crisis diplomatically,” he said such resolution “cannot be achieved while Russian
59 military forces continue their incursions into Ukrainian territory and that the
60 large-scale Russian military exercises on Ukraine’s borders only exacerbate the
61 tension,” the White House statement said.

62 European Union leaders are slated to meet in Brussels on Monday to decide
63 whether they may impose their own economic sanctions on Russia. The EU said
64 in a joint statement Sunday that Crimea’s referendum was “illegal and
65 illegitimate.”

66 In an executive order signed early this month, Mr. Obama paved the way for
67 biting U.S. sanctions that could target what the administration described as any
68 “individuals and entities” deemed to be threatening peace and stability in Ukraine.

69 The House pushed through a bill last week that would broadly support such
70 sanctions.

71 Rep. Edward R. Royce, California Republican, said Sunday that “Congress and
72 the president must impose tough sanctions and other measures on those who have
73 brought about this crisis.”

74 He added that “the phony referendum in Crimea is a throwback to the Soviet era”
75 and asserted that the Obama administration “should be working overtime to help
76 break Putin’s energy grip on Ukraine and Eastern Europe.”

77 His comments echoed those of other lawmakers from both sides of the aisle who
78 have cited the developments of the past few weeks as reasons for a major U.S.
79 shift in energy policy to wean the region from dependence on Russia’s natural gas
80 and oil.

81 The thrust of their argument has been that Washington is not doing enough to
82 facilitate the export of U.S. natural gas to Europe. With the Ukraine crisis as a

83 backdrop, the call for such an export push is receiving unprecedented traction in
84 Washington.

85 But foreign policy and energy analysts generally agree that it may be irrelevant —
86 at least in the immediate term — because it would take years for U.S. exports to
87 flow in such a way that has any significant impact on Europe’s overall energy
88 picture. The U.S. does not have a single terminal capable of processing natural gas
89 for export to Europe, and it likely would take at least three years to build one.

90 In the meantime, dependence on Russian national gas that flows through pipelines
91 crisscrossing Ukraine is working behind the scenes to dissuade Washington’s
92 allies in Western Europe from countering Moscow with anything more than angry
93 rhetoric.

94 Germany, which has emerged during recent years as perhaps the most influential
95 player in European geopolitics, remains the No. 1 buyer from Gazprom, the state-
96 owned energy monopoly in Moscow.

97 Such realities are likely what prompted Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican,
98 to declare Sunday that Russia is “a gas station masquerading as a country.”

99 Appearing on CNN’s “State of the Union,” Mr. McCain said that “in the long
100 term,” Washington should think seriously about “working to get energy supplies
101 to Ukraine and other countries in Europe.”

102 More immediately, Mr. McCain said, the U.S. should be providing military
103 support to Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

104 “I think that economic sanctions are a very important step,” he said, adding that
105 Washington should simultaneously resume a plan for missile defense installations
106 in Poland and the Czech Republic — a plan Mr. Obama halted during his first
107 term in the wake of strong opposition from Moscow.

Appendix III

(H) *Xinhua News Agency*: 克里米亚独立 正式申请入俄¹

2014年03月18日 10:04:13 来源: 中国新闻网

1 乌克兰克里米亚自治共和国决定自身地位的全民公决投票²，于当地时间16
2 日举行。根据已公布的初步统计结果，公投最终投票率为83.1%，其中赞成
3 加入俄罗斯的选票超过了96%。克里米亚议会17日宣布这一地区独立，正式
4 申请加入俄罗斯联邦。议会同时宣布，包括两大能源公司在内的当地一切国
5 有资产将国有化，归属克里米亚共和国。

6 选民压倒性地选择入俄³

7 据克里米亚电视台17日报道，对公投全部选票的统计结果表明，96.6%的投
8 票者赞成克里米亚加入俄罗斯。

9 乌克兰克里米亚自治共和国全民公投筹备与执行委员会主席马雷舍夫说，全
10 部选票统计已于当天凌晨2时完成，结果表明，绝大多数投票者赞成加入俄
11 罗斯，占投票者总数的96.6%，赞成留在乌克兰的投票者占2.55%，0.85%为
12 废票。

13 马雷舍夫16日在计票过半数后宣布，公投最终投票率为83.1%。

14 代表团赴俄进一步磋商⁴

15 克里米亚自治共和国议会17日决定，克里米亚独立成为主权国家，命名为克
16 里米亚共和国。

17 议会17日通过决议，宣布这一地区独立，并正式提出申请加入俄罗斯联邦。

18 决议同时说，半岛一切国有资产将国有化，归属克里米亚共和国。

¹ Translation: Crimea became independent and officially applies to join Russia.

² Translation: A vote to determine citizens' own status.

³ Translation: Voters overwhelmingly chose to join Russia.

⁴ Translation: Delegations go to Russia for further consultations.

19 克里米亚第一副总理鲁斯塔姆·捷米尔加利耶夫说，克里米亚已建立新的中
20 央银行。它不久后将成为俄罗斯中央银行下属的地方分行。⁵同时，俄罗斯
21 卢布将成当地第二种官方货币，与乌克兰货币格里夫纳同时流通。

22 由克里米亚议员组成的代表团17日晚些时候启程前往俄罗斯首都莫斯科，与
23 俄方进一步商讨入俄事宜。⁶

24 克里米亚总理阿克肖诺夫是代表团成员之一。他临行前在微博客网站“推特
25 ”上写道：“我们正要飞往莫斯科。”当天晚些时候，他又在微博客上更新
26 道，俄罗斯将向克里米亚提供150亿卢布(约合4.1亿美元)经济援助。⁷

27 **影响 克里米亚面临重重挑战**

28 加入俄罗斯需要俄方同意并经历一系列法律程序，克里米亚短时间内将在经
29 济、民生等方面面临一系列挑战。

30 新社认为，摆在克里米亚当地居民面前的可能是持续数月经济混乱和法律真
31 空。脱离乌克兰后，克里米亚事实上需要独立运作。

32 克里米亚总理阿克肖诺夫多次向当地民众保证加入俄罗斯会是一个简单的过
33 程，但承认可能需要一年时间。⁸

34 克里米亚当地政府打算在本周开始引入俄罗斯货币卢布，在大约6个月时间
35 内同时使用乌克兰货币格里夫纳。并非所有当地居民都对经济前景充满信心
36 。一些银行出现了挤兑，尤其是在乌克兰国有银行的支行。

37 克里米亚的电力、供暖和水均由外地供应。法新社说，基辅当局如果对公投
38 结果实施报复，可能切断供应。

39 另外一个需要在短时间解决的事项是乌克兰驻克里米亚的基地和军队。

⁵ Translation: Crimea has already set up a new central bank which will become one of the branches subordinate to Russian Central Bank.

⁶ Translation: (The delegations) will go to Russian capital Moscow to carry out further consultations with Russia.

⁷ Translation: Russia will provide 15 billion roubles (approx. 410 million US dollars) to Crimea as economic assistance.

⁸ Translation: To join Russia will be a simple process, but it will take a year for acknowledgement.

40 克里米亚领导人说，驻扎在克里米亚的乌克兰军人可以选择以俄罗斯军人的
41 身份继续服役，或者离开克里米亚。

42 反应

43 俄罗斯 杜马称将尽快接纳

44 俄罗斯国家杜马(议会下院)主席纳雷什金17日说，俄罗斯将尽快接纳克里米
45 亚加入俄罗斯。

46 据悉，俄国家杜马将于本月21日开始启动审议克里米亚入俄问题，全部法律
47 程序走完大概需要3天至3个月不等。⁹

48 俄联邦委员会(议会上院)副主席伊利亚斯·乌马哈诺夫也表示，有关接纳克
49 里米亚加入俄罗斯的立法程序不会拖延，俄方将在最短时间内做出相关立法
50 决定。¹⁰

51 俄罗斯议会上下两院定于18日在克里姆林宫召开联合会议，商讨这项议题。
52 总统普京将在会上发表讲话。

53 俄罗斯外交部17日发表声明，呼吁乌克兰成为联邦制国家，放权给地方政府
54 。声明写道，乌克兰应召开会议修改宪法，变国家为联邦制，赋予地方更多
55 自治权。

56 乌克兰 召回驻俄大使协商

57 乌克兰外交部17日说，鉴于克里米亚当前的局势，乌方决定召回乌驻俄罗斯
58 大使以便进行协商。

59 国际文传电讯社报道，乌克兰总理亚采纽克17日表示，乌方现在和将来都不
60 会承认“所谓的克里米亚全民公投”。

⁹ Translation: It is reported that the Russian State Duma will start the consideration of Crimea's joining Russia on the 21st of this month. It will take about from three days to three months to finish all the legal procedures.

¹⁰ Translation: The legislation process of admitting Crimea into Russia will not be delayed and related decisions will be made in the shortest possible time.

61 此外，乌克兰议会17日通过决定，批准进行局部动员的代总统令。代行乌总
62 统职责的议长图尔奇诺夫当天早些时候表示，他签署上述代总统令是由于克
63 里米亚半岛社会和政治局势恶化。乌当局准备优先动员自愿参军的人以及在
64 军队服过役的军事专家。他还指出，日前进行的克里米亚全民公决不会被乌
65 克兰承认。

66 欧美 敲定对俄制裁名单

67 美国总统奥巴马17日宣布对7名俄罗斯官员和4名乌克兰官员实施制裁。

68 白宫当日发表声明称，奥巴马通过签署行政命令，宣布对侵犯乌克兰主权和
69 领土完整负有责任的俄方和乌方官员实施签证禁令和资产冻结等制裁措施。

70 受到美国制裁的俄方官员包括普京的两名顾问弗拉季斯拉夫·苏尔科夫和谢
71 尔盖·格拉济耶夫，以及俄罗斯副总理德米特里·罗戈津。受到制裁的乌方
72 官员包括乌克兰前总统亚努科维奇和克里米亚总理谢尔盖·阿克肖诺夫。

73 俄副总理罗戈津当天在微博客网站上表示，制裁对于那些在海外没有资产的
74 俄方官员不会产生影响。

75 此外，欧盟国家外长17日在布鲁塞尔举行会议，敲定针对克里米亚和俄罗斯
76 的制裁名单。制裁对象将因“威胁乌克兰领土完整、主权和独立”的行为受
77 到旅行限制、资产冻结等制裁。

78 立陶宛外长利纳斯·林克维丘斯当天晚些时候在微博客网站上说，制裁名单
79 上最终有21人，欧盟将于数日内出台更多制裁措施。制裁名单将在欧盟公报
80 中公布，据信分别为13名俄罗斯人和8名克里米亚人。

81 中国 希望各方保持克制

82 中国外交部发言人洪磊17日回应克里米亚公投结果表示，中方在乌克兰问题
83 上秉持客观公正立场。¹¹

¹¹ Translation: Objective and impartial stance.

84 洪磊说，中方高度关注克里米亚局势发展，希望各方保持克制，尽快通过对
85 话寻求政治解决途径，¹²在尊重各方合理关切和正当权益的基础上，实现克
86 里米亚问题的妥善处理和解决。

87 分析

88 乌不具备与俄彻底决裂资本

89 在公投举行前，乌当局已明确表示不承认公投结果。

90 分析人士认为，尽管乌当局认定克里米亚公投不具合法性，但如何处理公投
91 结果公布后的问题将会更加棘手。

92 乌克兰总理亚采纽克日前说，欧盟国家准备于本月21日与乌克兰签署联系国
93 协定政治部分。然而在经济领域，尤其在天然气供应方面，乌克兰对俄的过
94 于依赖无疑是乌的“软肋”，因此在目前情况下，乌克兰还不具备与俄罗斯
95 “彻底决裂”的资本。

96 此外，克里米亚的公投可能会加重乌东部亲俄地区的分离主义倾向。对乌当
97 局来说，能否有效应对这部分亲俄民众近期掀起的大规模抗议浪潮将是严峻
98 挑战。在这个问题上如果处理不好，乌克兰可能陷入严重分裂的境地。

99 “新乌克兰”战略研究所所长叶尔莫拉耶夫说，不管全民公投结果如何，乌
100 克兰当局都应该尽快提出解决克里米亚问题的清晰方案。他认为，克里米亚
101 和乌克兰东部地区发生的事件证明，乌当局要团结各方，而不是有近有疏。

102 普京与奥巴马通话态度强硬

103 目前，克里米亚公投的结果已经产生，下一步各方关注的焦点将转为俄罗斯
104 如何接纳这一结果以及西方下一步的动作。

105 不少俄分析人士认为，总统普京会继续坚持强硬态度。

106 俄总统普京16日深夜与美国总统奥巴马通电话。普京在交谈中重申乌克兰克
107 里米亚自治共和国公投符合国际法准则和联合国宪章。¹³

¹² Translation: To seek a political solution through dialogues.

108 俄罗斯高等经济学院国际事务系副主任苏兹达利采夫认为，对于克里米亚并
109 入俄罗斯，普京不会退让，普京也已经做好应对西方制裁的准备。

110 俄罗斯著名政论杂志《全球政治中的俄罗斯》总编辑卢基扬诺夫认为，俄罗
111 斯妥协是毫无意义的，只会引发新的危机。在俄看来，黑海舰队驻扎在克里
112 米亚半岛是关乎国家安全的问题，如果克里米亚入俄，黑海舰队的战略问题
113 将迎刃而解。

114 克里米亚公投结果无疑会恶化俄乌关系以及俄罗斯与西方国家的关系。卢基
115 扬诺夫说，俄罗斯不承认乌克兰当局的合法性。公投之后，俄罗斯和乌克兰
116 关系也不会发生什么重大变化。而俄罗斯和欧美的关系可能会严重恶化。然
117 而，欧洲对俄制裁也存在难度，因为他们自己也会受到影响。（据新华社）

118 入俄程序

119 申请

120 公投结果并不意味着当地居民的生活将在一夜之间发生彻底改变。首先，克
121 里米亚需要向俄罗斯总统普京提出申请加入俄罗斯的要求。如果普京同意，
122 这一请求将转给议会上下两院，即俄联邦委员会和国家杜马，起草俄罗斯与
123 新联邦成员的条约。

124 过渡

125 条约将设定一个过渡阶段，以便新成员实现与俄罗斯在经济、金融、信用和
126 司法系统方面的融合。

127 表决

128 双方签署条约后，俄罗斯宪法法院会确认条约是否合法。俄联邦委员会和国
129 家杜马随后将分别表决条约。

¹³ Translation: Putin reiterated that Crimea status referendum is consistent with the international laws and the UN Charter.